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Crime as Social Reality
By JEROMEHALL

E

VERYBODY talks about "crime"
and "criminals"; and their meaning. The answers are assumed to exist;
they are assumed to be common property. Actually, the obvious conceals the
most difficult of problems. The simple
questions, on second thought, become the
most provocative ones, even though they
are not in the least impertinent.
MEANING OF "CRIME"

The most obvious fact about "crime"
is that the term is employed in many different senses. The basic difficultiesconcern the meaning of "crime." Many
words in everyday discourseare to some
extent and in some contexts, ambiguous.
This is especially true of words having
to do with social affairs, human relationships, where what is most significant
meets neither eye nor ear. But "crime"
and "criminal" are loaded with even
greater burdens than are most of these
terms. Here one quickly recognizesthat
communicationof ideas is not the only
function of language; for, plainly, "criminal" is a term that is much more than
description. It is also a word of reproach, of condemnation,of obloquy, of
stimulation to action and to repression.
In recent months "criminal" has entered the common vocabulary of international propaganda; the leaders of the
warring countries call each other "criminal." The speakerwishes to arouseemotion, to move his audience in a desired
direction. It has become abundantly
evident that "criminal" is a tag to be
placed on political enemies-not merely
or even especially on those who injure
person or property. Much too frequently it has been an instrument to
mask the torture of great benefactors
of mankind. In a number of countries
we find new criminal codes expressed in
1

the broadest possible terms constructed
on a sweeping axiom of "social defense."
"Criminalbehavior"is, accordingly,any
"antisocial" conduct, and in actual administration, "antisocial" becomes any
conduct that runs counter to the politics
of the regime. The meaning of "criminal" is thus determined by authority,
i.e., by force. Some of our criminologists are beginning to wake up to the
fact that there are political and ethical
problems involved in "crime" that the
term is sometimes chiefly an index of
who has power to wield the maximum
force. In addition, we are familiar with
equally loose usages in everyday talk,
where the speaker means to say that certain persons or behaviors are unethical,
unprincipled,degenerate,or even stupid.
It might be imagined that within the
confines of the law there would be few
such troublesomequestions. But unless
one is content to run in a circle, it is
plain that even here the accepted definition of "crime"is only superficiallyprecise. This may be seen by reference to
the perennial issue of the differencesbetween "crime" and "tort." A crime is
a violation of a penal law, it is said, while
torts are proscribed by civil or private
law. Yet so great a scholar as Austin
contended that there were no substantial
differences between the two, perhaps
least of all on the basis of the degree or
importance of the public interest. Nor
is it easy to demonstrate that punishment characterizes the one, compensation the other. Punitive damages and
penal actions are only the most salient of
the difficultiesin the way of this thesis.
The law has been largely directed by
procedure in its early history, and by
the purposes of litigants and their lawyers; perhaps only by the suggested
functional differences can the two be
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distinguished. Even within the more restricted field that is invariably labeled
"criminal," the same difficulty persists.
It is seen, notably, in the distinctions
drawn between crimes mala in se and
those mala prohibita, or, as a recent
writer would have it, between the real
crimes and the public torts.
Thus it is apparent that even when
limited to law, "crime" has such varied
denotation as to suggest that the wisest
course may turn out to be elimination
of the word entirely from scientific discourse, and substitution of numerous
specific terms. In any event, if we think
that beyond emotive, prerogative, and
loose uses of the word there are facts
denoted by the term "crime" which can
be clearly describedand understood,and
that, proceeding thus, we can discover
better answers to the relevant distressing
social problems than any now known,
our first bit of sophisticationis to be on
guard against this insidious ambiguity of
everyday speech.
Nonetheless, any significant critique
of crime must inevitably be oriented in
the existing "recognized"discussions of
it. If we analyze such discourse,we may
be able to discover the principal issues
and the difficultiesin the way of greater
understanding. If we work our way
through the existing field as carefully
and intuitively as possible, at the same
time nourishing awareness of besetting
linguistic quicksands as well as of our
own predilections, what do we find?
EMOTIONAND ANALYSIS

About as certain an observation as
any is that emotion has something to
do with crime itself-not merely talking
about it. Public feeling is commonwhen
there is public knowledge of major
harms; the deeply rooted affective states
are revealed in newspapers,in the courtroom, sometimes in violent, overt attacks. The criminal law may be viewed
as the rationalization of such states,

though it is much more than that. One
has only to scrutinize "scholarly" discussions to discover here too, alas, frequent biases in what purport to be
rigorously objective analyses of the phenomena.
The need to emphasize this second
pervading difficulty should be obvious
to any thoughtful observer who consciously, at least, serves no other end
than discovery of truth in this most difficult of all fields of exploration. Sometimes these drives are sublimated into
desire for reform, in itself surely not
unworthy, yet all too frequently clouding the scholar's mind, rendering fruitful debate impossible. Social policy is
as importantas social science; but unless
preferences and evaluations are distinguished from knowledgeand understanding, there is little reason to expect
marked progress in any social science,
and least, perhaps, in criminology.
The current Sociology of Knowledge
raises interesting problems in this regard; such analysis of ideologies is apt
to be circumspect. As to discussions of
crime, we have long been victims of
scholastic oversimplifications, even of
fads that, in abortive efforts to surmount
the real difficulties,limited the range of
investigation to muscular movements,
with talk and thought either ignored or
labeled "oral behavior," as though that
aided understanding.
Next to such narrowing of the phenomena together with the limiting axioms of mechanics implied thereby to be
the sole source of explanation, understanding has been further restricted by
other dogmas, notably by rather perverse theories of human nature. With
human beings, especially primitives, regarded as wholly irrational and as inexorably fixed in the course of their
conduct, any discipline constructed on
correspondingpremiseswould hardly enlighten. Persistent effort is required to
limit ambiguity and emotion and the
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appeal of mechanistic and particularistic
rationalizations. Only by maximum efforts to slough off the artificial garb of
fashionable vocabulary, only by steadfast efforts to rise above the Schools,
may we hope to talk sense about the
major problemsof social disorganization.
ACTIONS, TALK, AND THEORY

The above remarks indicate that we
need to distinguish what "the common
man" does and says about crime from
what scholars say about crime. Viewed
in broadest outline, the first enterprise,
if assiduously prosecuted, would be a
sort of chronicle, a history of conflicts
and disputes, the pains and injuries human beings have inflicted on one another in connection therewith, and what
reasons they gave to explain their conduct. This would include the actions
and talk of "offenders" (from society's
viewpoint; "oppressed"from their own),
as well as those of pater, chieftain, official ("oppressor"or "tyrant" from the
"offender's"point of view). The second
sort of enterprisewould constitute analysis of the discussionsof scholars, of theories of the above noted phenomena.
Although this dichotomy should be
useful analytically, it is apparent that
the two realms intermingle: in the very
selection by the scholar of "significant"
phenomena, are premised theories and
values, shared with the community itself. But scholars are conscious of
their value-judgments. The suggested
approach centers initially on observable
phenomena. We can see individuals
inflicting physical injuries on one another, we can see the conduct designated "assaults," "trespasses to property," "homicide," and so forth. In
addition to the participants in these
doings, there is the behavior of third
persons, including group behavior or
that of its representatives, namely, the
"banishments,""executions,""imprison-
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ments," and such. One central problem
is: Why do these outsiders interfere?
Once this question is asked, we have
left the sphere of behavior alone, and
think in terms of culture and motivation.
Indeed, no one has seriously tried to explain such phenomena solely by reference to observable behavior; the very
inclusion of group behavior, at least
when that extends beyond the immediate
family, implies some theory of significance not entirely dependent on behavior. Here, then, it is essential to
take account of the talk that accompanies the behavior. It representsvarious levels of significance. The parties
themselves base their conduct on various
rationalizations,understandingof which
requires reference to nonphysical or
metaphysical entities. A man has failed
to bring a sacrifice to the gods, he has
performed an act taboo, he has ridiculed his mother-in-law-the very recital
points to ideas that are much more potent in their effect on conduct than
many physical forces. In their talk
about the unpleasant conduct of their
fellows, simple people are concrete.
What the "wise" man says will depend
on whether he is an official intent on
enforcement, or a mere onlooker-a
scholar perhaps. In these latter instances, there is apt to be generalization
about laws, norms, customs, mores, protection of society, and the like.
We here and now confront so much of
the above phenomenaas is known to us,
and our job is to reach a fuller understanding of it all-the doings, the common talk, the official pronouncements,
and the analyses of scholars. Is it possible to take a fresh approachto the entire problem, one that promises results?
Recent exploration for some core of
meaning of "crime"has resulted in such
general notions as "disapproval,""violation of group values," and "injury to
public interests," as common denominators. But the besetting evil here is that
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the generality of these ideas sharply
diminishes both their significance as
symbols and their utility as instruments
of discovery.
RELATIVITY OF CRIME

Coupled with the above insights is the
prevalent hypothesis that crime is relative to time and place. This apparently
means that the behavior punished (and,
presumably, the values, disapprobation,
and so forth) varies from place to place
and from time to time. The supporting
instances are familiar--polygamy is
criminal in the United States, it is even
approved in other countries; so, also,
as to patricide among primitives, and
prohibition of alcoholic beverages with
us.
It is common in such discussion to
concede that three or four crimes, usually, treason, murder, incest, and theft,
are universal. The problem raises numerous difficulties. The minor ones can
be summarily dismissed. Thus, one
would not expect forgery to be criminal
in a preliterate society, nor speeding on
the Sahara or, indeed, in New York
prior to 1900, nor flying a plane 300
feet above a city prior to 1910. Such
immediate dependence of criminal behavior on culture and technology is too
evident to give rise to speculation. The
problem concerningthe relationshipsbetween socioeconomic conditions and
criminal behavior arises at the point
where we pass from specific instances of
criminal behavior to types of criminal
behavior. Not only must these categories be broad (e.g., crimes against
property without violence), but the
socioeconomic conditions must be generalized to the extent that apt analogies
can be found in societies representing
different cultures.
If, with this objective in view, we try
to uncover the facts "just as they actually occurred," we find a mass of
contradictoryevidence that makes likely

generalizationpresently very difficult, if
not impossible. Thus, many writers
assert that theft (as understood by us)
is universally criminal. But a trustworthy observer who spent many years
in India reports that "almost every Indian domestic pilfers . . . during his long

experience of the country he has rarely
met exceptions. This form of brigandage is ingrainedin their natures."
The deficienciesin existing studies regarding even this central problem, behavior universally held criminal, are
apparent on examination of the chief
authority on this subject, Westermarck's
Origin and Development of the Moral
Ideas. The ultimate testing ground is,
plainly, homicide; it is highly significant
that even here there is the greatest confusion, at least on the surface of the
data. Thus Westermarckreports:
Among various uncivilizedpeoples, however, human life is said to be held very
cheap. "The AustralianDieyerie, we are
told, wouldfor a mere triflekill their dearest friend. In Fiji there is an 'utter disregardof the value of human life.' . . .
Some of the Himalayanmountaineersare
reportedto put men to death merely for
the satisfactionof seeing the blood flow
and of markingthe last strugglesof the
victim." 2

But just prior to his quoting a mass of
contradictory data, he states: "I venture to believe that this [respect for our
fellow creatures' lives] holds good not
only among civilized nations, but among
the lower races as well; . . ." S Then

after statements of observersapparently
to the contrary, he concludes: "We may
without hesitation accept Professor Tylor's statement that 'no known tribe,
however low and ferocious, has ever
1 H. J. A. Hervey, Cameos of Indian Crime,
London, 1929.
2 As quoted in Edward
Westermarck, The
Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas
(London: Macmillan, 1906), Vol. I, pp. 32829.
SIbid., p. 328.
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admitted that men may kill one another
indiscriminately.'"4
TOWARD SCIENTIFIC GENERALIZATION

But what is "indiscriminate"? We
must rememberthat all civilized societies
condone, justify, and even approve certain homicides, quite in addition to war.
Consider our own law. In at least two
Americanstates, a husband may kill his
spouse or her paramour in the act of
adultery. Among certain people where,
we are told, hospitality requires a host
to place his wife at the disposal of a
guest, this rule of law might seem odd,
indeed. So, too, as to Holmes's decision
that a man may stand his ground if
attacked and kill his assailant despite
the fact that a safe avenue of retreat is
available. And what of the blanket rule
that permits a police officer to slay a
suspected felon to effect arrest, especially
when viewed in light of the arbitrary
classificationof offenses?
Perhaps we may hazard the view that
while some of these (to us) justifiable
homicides may seem as unjustifiable to
so-called primitive peoples as many of
their killings are to us, yet there is a
common ground. But thus far its statement has taken the form of such dubious
generalization as that the "irreducible
conditions of survival" (or of "civilization") must be preserved.
Consider, next, the usual appraisals
of primitive patricide. The clear implication is that the writer is talking about
the same behavior that constitutes homicide in our society, and that what is most
seriously condemnedby our laws, mores,
and ethics, is not only permitted but
approved and sometimes even required
in those societies.
The patent fallacy here is to compare
expurgated actual primitive practices
with the book-law of advanced societies.
4As quoted in Edward Westermarck, The
Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas
(London: Macmillan, 1906), Vol. I, p. 331.

5

What must be compared, instead, are
unwrittenprimitive legal norms with our
written laws, the entire relevant factsituations and behavior in both societies,
and the accompanying talk, rationalizations, pronouncements, and analyses.
We should probably find that the primitives who commit what our observers
call "patricide"also respect their parents
and share our ethical principles concerning treatment of them. On the
other hand, it would be necessary to
consider euthanasia in our society, and
numerousinstances of acquittal and pardon in cases of homicide of blood relations where relief from acute sufferingis
the motive. Thus, we, too, if judged by
our actual practices, indulge in invalidicide even where the behaviorcorresponds
to the legal definition of patricide. The
like is true of infanticide, typically recognized in administrationof the law as
disclosing considerable grounds for extreme mitigation of the penalty, which
has recently secured official recognition
in the English statute on the subject.5
The surest single generalization immediately available is that all societies
proscribe behavior that runs counter to
their preservation. Group preservation
requires not only prohibition of indiscriminate killings and of the lesser batteries and mayhems that lead directly
to such homicide; it also requires protection of infants, and consequently of
institutions that provide, as well, for
care of females during the childbearing
period and for some time afterwards.
Thus the generalizationthat "crime" is
"relative" does not aid understanding;
it merely points to the variation of criminal behavior and implies a total failure
to recognizeany common characteristics.
5 Cf. " But there can be little doubt that
the wholesale infanticide of many of the lower
races is in the main due to the hardships of
savage life." Westermarck, op. cit., p. 399.
"The exposure of deformed or sickly infants
was undoubtedly an ancient custom in Greece;
." Ibid., p. 408.
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Yet these are the sine qua non of any
science.
SOCIOECONOMICCONDITIONS

As a matter of fact, we have already
advanced our understanding of crime
much beyond the indications of assertions as to its "relativity"; for we know
a great deal about the relation of criminal behavior to social and economic conditions and also to technology. Especially is this true as regards crimes
against property as they developed in
England. This development has been
analyzed with special reference to the
Commercial Revolution that began in
the fifteenth century, and, with greater
detail, with reference to the Industrial
Revolution." We know that from a
single norm, "larceny" (patternedprobably on medieval cattle-lifting), which
originally designated simply direct,
physical taking of chattels from another's possession, there evolved several
different norms as social and economic
changes raised new needs. The new
norms denoted certain behaviors; as the
former came into existence, the latter
became crimes.
With the beginning of modern business in the latter part of the fifteenth
century, came employment of carriersto
deliver merchandise to distant points.
To these carriers the merchandise was
voluntarily handed over by the shippers;
hence, subsequent conversion would not
violate the law against stealing as then
defined. The process by which the
judges extended "larceny" to include
"breaking bulk" by a lawful possessor,
retaining but redefining the old words,
is important with regard to the role of
political agencies in the creation of criminal behavior. The origin of the new
offense is important, also, in relation to
changed economic conditions. The new
law designating certain behavior "crimiI See the writer's
Theft, Law and Society,
1935.

nal" constituted an attempt to meet
needs and demands arising from new
social problems.
The Commercial Revolution brought
mobility of population to a relatively
static society. Servants, previously anchored to estates, increasinglypicked up
and abscondedwith their masters'valuables. These chattels were in the servants' possession; hence, as in the carriers' case, conversion did not constitute
larceny. But since the servant was usually about the master's premises, it was
possible to designate the former'sphysical control of the property as mere "custody" and thus to place all-important
"possession"in the master, hence allowing a trespass to another'spossessionand
"larceny"-still the same old bottle, but
containing new substance thereafter.
Again a new crime and new criminals
were created; not arbitrarily,be it noted,
but upon rational grounds, to meet felt
needs and new attitudes regarding conduct previously tolerated, but now definitely antisocial under the changed conditions.
"Larceny" was a much broader avenue for adaptation to new conditions
than can be briefly indicated. Suffice it
to add that in 1780, some few years
prior to the rise of the law of fraud, the
ancient category gave birth to the new
offense of "larceny by trick," where
possession but not ownership was voluntarily transferred in reliance upon
fraudulent representationsof fact.
The law of criminal fraud is replete
with significance for the intimate interplay of legal norms,public attitudes, and
changing social and economic conditions.
The enormouslosses in stock speculation
as the bubbles burst developed awareness of the potency of "mere"misrepresentation of fact to wreak damage on a
large scale. Yet as late as 1761, in a
case where the defendant had misrepresented the quantity of merchandisesold,
a high English court, which included
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Mansfield, found no criminal liability,
declaring: "We are not to indict one
man for making a fool of another."
Less than thirty years later, criminal
fraud was created. Continued stock
losses, the disappearance of the guilds,
large-scale merchandising, purchases
from strangers at a distance, and the
new credit economy are among the important concomitantsocial and economic
changes. New law resulted; new "criminals" were designated for selection by
the punitive apparatus of legal control.
So far as certain individuals were concerned, it may have been sheer chance
that one day made them regarded as
respectable businessmen, and the next,
as criminals. But in the large, the development was a rational adaptation to
the interaction of many social forces
operating to create new social problems.
Today embezzlement is so common
that it comes as a shock to learn that
the crime did not exist in England until
1799. There were earlier special and
restricted types of embezzlement, confined, significantly enough, to the Bank
of England, the South Sea Company,
and the Post Office. But generally,prior
to 1799 there were simply "breaches of
trust"-not embezzlement; that is to
say, those who prior to 1799 were merely
untrustworthy, became after that date,
criminals.

7

scientific prescience concerning future
probabilities, that brought about the
new laws. It was experienceunder new
conditions and with many cases of large
depredation by servants, accumulating
more slowly than one imagines should
have been necessary, that provided the
driving force to change law to enlarge
the area of criminal behavior.
The above knowledge of theft, especially as it developed in England, carries
us an appreciable degree beyond mere
recognition that "crimes are relative to
time and place." But this knowledge
needs to be supplementedby that of corresponding developments in other countries (e.g., adequate Russian data for
the past twenty years) until we are able
to generalizeon the basis of specific comparative data. As yet we have hardly
begun to write the history of American
crime and criminal law, but it is probable that many relationships between
crime and social change similar to those
described above could be discovered;
obvious special points of attack in the
Americanscene would be cattle-rustling,
bootlegging, and racketeering.
LAWS RESULTFROMBASIC IDEAS

A similar history of crimes against the
person would present much more difficult
problems than did that of crimes against
property. So far as this writer is aware,
such a history has thus far evaded adeLAWS RESULT FROM EXPERIENCE
quate presentation. The reasons are
Again, it is well to note that these new sufficiently apparent; the interests inlaws and the consequentcriminalswhich, volved are elemental in the sefise of bein a somewhat odd sense, they may be ing representedin all societies, however
said to have "produced"were not for- primitive. Accordingly, the underlying
tuitous occurrences. Larceny by servant motives, values, and rationalizationsare
had long crystallized into behavior that so deeply rooted in the history of the
was restricted to receipt of goods from race as to defy easy exploration. Inthe master. The economic revolutions, stead of quantitative data and observespecially the rise of banks and other able phenomena that accompany and
large business institutions, transformed symbolize economic change, one would
employees' relations to the public into need to deal with imponderablesto a far
matters of paramount importance. Still greaterextent. The configurationwithin
it was not any rare imagination, any which this division of criminal law and
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crime must be set would need to be
constructed very largely from more or
less transcendentalforms, from ideas and
attitudes that are ingrained in human
nature and ancient institutions.
Equally difficultare crimes that spring
directly from certain other ideas. For
example, the criminallaws of the American Colonies include such offenses as
blasphemy, failure to attend church, dissenting, idleness, being a Quaker, scolding, and by no means least in significance, witchcraft. How far does it
advance our understandingof these offenses to know that they were "relative
to the time and place"? And we have
only to remember that Matthew Hale,
one of the greatest scholars of modern
times, presided at some of the major
trials for witchcraft in England, to caution against such facile generalizations
about the Salem trials. Even Blackstone, writing in the latter part of the
eighteenth century, credits the existence
of witchcraft. It is apparentthat understanding such offensesis directly dependent, in part, on an adequate history of
ideas.

largely because of insistence that punishment be inflicted only on immoral persons. But in other fields of law, notably
torts, absolute liability, i.e., liability despite due care, has been widely implemented in recent years. Perhaps similar
reasons can be invoked in defense of
mala prohibita if the absence of any
mens rea is assumed. The major theoretical difficulties seem rather to relate
to penalization for negligent conduct,
and to interpretationsthat would eliminate responsibility entirely as irrelevant
to penal treatment.
The history of lack of mental capacity
as a defense parallelsmuch of the law on
culpability of normal persons. It is still
common for writers intent solely on reform to assert that an eighteenth-century
judge held that a person had to be "as
mad as a wild beast" before he could
be exculpated on grounds of mental disease. There usually follow desultory
remarks on the progress in psychology,
culminating in fulsome praise of the
achievements of that discipline in the
twentieth century. The facts are rather
more complicated,even after contemporary psychology is critically evaluated.
LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY
The eighteenth-century judge did not
Similar problemsare presented by the say what is reported of him. He said
rules of law on responsibility for crimi- the diseasedperson does "not know what
nal behavior, especially with reference he is doing, no more than a wild beast";
to diseased minds. The accepted version and his opinion, read in its entirety, is
has it that earliest liability was absolute, much too sensible to be distorted into
and that many centuries passed before the above exaggeration.' As a matter
modern ideas of culpability, resting on of fact, if we go back as far as the thirdistinctions between such notions as teenth century and read Bracton fairly,
negligence, intention, and accident, were we may come away with no little admiaccepted. But discovery has been slight ration for the understanding and modand long retarded in the field of ancient eration of those days regardingresponsilegal history; hence we must recall bility of mentally diseased persons. The
Holmes's opposition to the above thesis, history of ethics and epistemology is
and his suggestive remark that even a ancient and pregnant with ideas current
dog distinguishes between an intentional today.
beating and an accidental injury. In
So, too, ideas on culpability seem to
any event, we know that "understand- have persisted over longer periods of
ing" and "volition"have importantbear7R v. Arnold (1724) 16 How. St. Tr. 695,
ings on culpability in our criminal law 764.
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time and to have been modified only
slightly in comparison with overt behavior designated "criminal." But if
the elements that constitute culpability
in our law seem to be few and relatively
static, we must rememberthat these conceptions lie in the most difficult part of
criminal law and criminology. Until we
have had sustained analyses of the relation of these ideas to intellectual, social,
and legal problems in various countries
and times, we must cling to a wholesome skepticism of any existing interpretations.
ADEQUACY OF LEGAL CONCEPTS

As regards both the overt phases of
criminal behavior and those aspects of
it that refer to responsibility, one major
problem concerns the adequacy of legal
concepts. It must be recognized that
there is a constant, practically inevitable
lag between the legal categories and actual behaviorpatterns; this lag increases
in proportionto the accelerationof social
change. Indeed, there is little factual
content in any legal definition of crime
that is entirely invariant over a long
period of years. Not only do the words
change in meaning more or less without
such change being noticed, but also, the
professionals distort, expand, and contract them as they deem necessary. Human beings are thus occasionallybrought
within the punitive apparatus against
reasonableexpectation, or perhaps, more
fortunately, they escape despite coincidence of legal norm and behavior.
It is impossible here to develop the
technical aspects of the above problem.
They have received considerable attention in current jurisprudence,especially
where the function of the judicial process
has been emphasized or where wide reforms have been sought. Irrationalism
and "verbal camouflage"are blanket and
all-too-easy dispositions of legal concepts. The actual existence and functions of these entities are evidenced by

9

conduct, by repeated common occurrences, by uniform patterns of behavior
in societies where laws are unwritten,
as well as in our own. If this is established, investigation moves into fair perspective and permits the most searching
inquiries as to correspondenceof norm
with actuality; no less does it provide
for the most detailed, uncompromising
criticism of the adequacy of existing
legal concepts to implement attainment
of desirable objectives.
This actual inadequacy and the limitations accordingly imposed on administration even by the best possible personnel produce areas of uncertainty, a
shadowland where crime merges imperceptibly into lawful conduct. It is indefensible to hold individualsresponsible
or malevolent for the consequences of
these conditions. Explanation must, of
course, include all sorts of motivation;
frequently forgotten are the institutions,
the given concepts, ends, economic conditions, and the concrete fact-situations
that raise specific problems in the total
culture complex. Thus when we find
that prior to the rise of criminal fraud,
certain behavior (e.g., the ring-dropping
confidence game) was held larceny by
trick, and that afterwards identical behavior was held fraud, i.e., obtaining
property by false pretenses,we must not
indulge in particularismsthat ignore the
total situation. Rather we must probe
the relevant social realities for more
adequate explanations. This not only
does not check, it facilitates understanding of existing terminology and legal
conceptions. There is no a priori reason, therefore, to continue to accept
such formulations as mens rea, mala in
se, mala prohibita, malice aforethought,
premeditation, larceny by trick, and
many others, as including adequate descriptions of significant realities. Too
many innocent persons get hoisted on
the petard of such archaism; yet we
have only just begun to make the de-
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tailed empirical researchesthat are necessary to sustain intelligent reform of
existing legal concepts.
THEORIES OF CRIME

In all discussions of crime, as in the
above, certain facts are described; it
is obvious that their selection is influenced by value-judgmentsand by other
interpretations as to significance. If
we consider the discourses of scholars,
we find an elaborate array of explanation that complicates analysis considerably. We can simply take note of the
variety of these theories on the nature
of crime. They have run, broadly, in
physical, biological, and social terms;
some have been devoted entirely to individual differences, others to cultural
processes. There are theories based on
"interests" with stress on security or
group survival or the power of economically dominant classes; taboo, discipline, sympathetic identification with
victims of attack, ethical principles, and
penal laws have provided the foundations of other theories. If we view theorizing on crime chronologically,and for
convenience indulge in certain arbitrary
divisions, we can distinguish theological
(St. Paul, Bernard), ethical (Kant),
classical (Beccaria), utilitarian (Bentham), formalist (Austin), positivist
(Lombroso, Garofalo, Ferri), various
neo-modifications of the above, and
pragmatist (Saldafia) versions.
It is apparent that these theories parallel the entire history of western
thought. They may be regarded as a
type of opinion in so far as they, too,
reflect phases of the total culture complex within which crime is integrated.
(Such employment of theories is, of
course, not to be confused with inquiries
as to their validity.) Adding theory to
"conditions,"we can achieve greater insight into the basic realities within
which crimes as social phenomena are
integrated.

CRIME AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

Criminologists study those phases of
social reality which irritate, produce tension, run counter to accepted values, constitute social problems. Specifically,
their concern is those social problems
that center on violation of actual penal
laws.s Understandingthese social problems depends on knowledge of social
realities, which not only defy actual division, but which can be comprehended
only as integers. Hence criminology
and the other social disciplines do not
representdistinctive types of theory, nor
are they concerned with essentially different subject-matters. They can be
differentiatedonly in terms of the types
of questions asked concerning social
phenomena. Convenience and lack of
time require division of labor, but these
are only human limitations, not imposed
by the nature of the data we seek to
understand. Ideally, each social discipline would, therefore, represent the
incidence of all social science upon distinctive questions posed by thoughtful
persons. These questions are suggested
not arbitrarily,but by the nature of social problems that have reference to
common social realities.
CRIMINOLOGYAS INTEGRATION

To illustrate the above and to implement the writer's thesis that all social
scientists are concerned with common
social realities, about which they legitimately ask different questions, consider
crime as "a violation of a penal law."
Only logicians and lawyers may be content with the legal definition of "crime."
It suits their purposes. Criminologists
consider the fact that while some laws
(and pro tanto, crimes) may be arbitrary or archaic, on the whole (barring
despotism) they have an intimate rela8 This has received detailed analysis in the
writer's "Prolegomena to a Science of Criminal
Law" (1941) 89 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 549.
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tionship to moral attitudes, to ethics, to
the affective nature of man, to culture,
and to custom. If the approach is by
way of "violation of group values against
which the group reacts punitively," we
are confronted by the whole sweep of
social life, which we can penetrate only
with partial insight. Or suppose our
starting point is "social disorganization"
or "social pathology." Can we understand these without knowing "social organization," which, in other terms, also
involves the whole of social reality?
We can implement the argument specifically in terms that refer to other social disciplines: consider one of the commonest of crimes-the theft of automobiles and the related receiving stolen
goods. Where can one stop in understanding this behavior? Private enterprise and the market place; technology
and invention; environment, especially
of urban centers; moral attitudes toward
private property; ethical principles; law
enforcement; juvenile delinquency; the
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personalities involved; biological inferiority; and many others-is there any
actual boundary which can be imposed
on the social phenomenarelevant to this
single type of criminal behavior?
In terms of existing disciplines, one
can readily perceive many relations to
economics, sociology, ethics, social psychology, biology, and others. These
disciplines can be reconstructed much
more rapidly than the social realities
they explore. Increase in knowledge in
criminology,as in each of the social sciences, consists in this very exploration
of the interrelationships of phenomena
relevant to questions asked about certain
social problems, i.e., in the construction
of a total significant social configuration.
The collaboration that has existed for
many years between legal scholars and
criminologists has produced a body of
social science and a knowledge of methods of researchthat have significancefor
integration of the social disciplines generally.
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